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Sixty years have passed since President Truman, upon signing the keelof the navy’s newest vessel the USS Nautilus, spoke wistfully of a daywhen the world’s fırst atomic-powered submarine would become “a
historic relic of a threat of war long passed.”1 Ahead lay decades of nuclear
brinksmanship, the “long twilight struggle” between East and West. Yet
today,Nautilus does indeed sit quietly dockside inGroton, Connecticut, the
principal exhibit at a museum whose visitors, for the most part, were not
even born whenNautilus played a starring role in one of the most dramatic
episodes of the early Cold War. In a secret operation code named “Opera-
tion Sunshine,” Nautilus, in August 1958, became the fırst submarine to
cross between the Pacifıc and Atlantic oceans via the North Pole. Skillfully
managed by the Eisenhower administration, Operation Sunshine capital-
ized on both the material and symbolic capacities of Nautilus to give a
much-needed boost to American confıdence at home in the grim months
after the success of the Sputniks and the sputtering start of America’s own
space program.
This essay argues that Operation Sunshine was a technological spectacle
conceived, carried out, and exploited within the framework of the domestic
Cold War propaganda imperatives of the Eisenhower White House and
within the material limitations of the Nautilus itself. To be sure, there is a
respectable body of literature on the combined roles of technology, specta-
cle, and rhetoric in the Cold War.2 However, for purposes of this essay the
terms will be aligned in a certain way. Thus, while any technological
achievement, broadly speaking, involves “material,” “symbolic,” and poten-
tially even “rhetorical” elements, it is the consciousmanagement ofmaterial
technology and the symbolic values associated with it for rhetorical pur-
poses that are my particular interest. In other words, it is the manner in
which the material and symbolic aspects of a technological achievement
constrain its suasory possibilities, closing off some options while opening
up others, that defınes a technological spectacle.
Looming over any technological spectacle, of course, is the possibility
that a targeted public will draw the wrong lessons from it. There are many
opportunities to do so, after all. The audience may, for example, construe
the material and symbolic elements of the operation as incompatible, or
they may pay too much attention to one at the expense of the other. The
press may develop a narrative of events that magnifıes, in the eyes of its
planners, some irrelevant or undesirable aspect of the mission. The sym-
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bolic demands of the spectacle may exceed the operational limits of the
technology, or the human elementmay be overshadowed by the technolog-
ical (or vice versa). All of these risks are assumed when undertaking the
execution of a technological spectacle. Thus, it behooves offıcials to harmo-
nize the material and symbolic aspects of an event, if it is to be effective
rhetorically.
The interplay of material and symbolic aspects in Operation Sunshine, I
argue, gave rise to at least three rhetorical problems. Among these were the
necessity of reconciling the promise and the threat represented by the
mission, the necessity of choosing a dramaticmissionwithin the capabilities
ofNautilus and then depicting it as simultaneously “remarkable” and “rou-
tine,” and, fınally, the necessity of reconciling Nautilus’s technological and
human elements. In response to each of these problems, the Eisenhower
administration promoted an interpretation of Operation Sunshine that
served its rhetorical objectives. Although this essay is intended primarily as
an exercise in rhetorical history, the rhetorical strategies employed by the
Eisenhower White House during Operation Sunshine may have continued
relevance in the twenty-fırst century.
The argument outlined above is divided into fıve parts. Part one de-
scribes the opening for spectacle afforded by the success of the Sputniks and
the embarrassments of the Vanguard program. Part two describes how the
material as well as symbolic constructions of theUSS Nautilus interacted in
ways that influenced its value as an instrument of the Cold War. Part three
describesOperation Sunshine itself. Part four examines the rhetorical prob-
lems raised by Operation Sunshine and details efforts by the White House
and domestic press to resolve them. Part fıve offers some tentative lessons of
this case study for students of technological spectacles both within and
beyond the context of the Cold War.
SPUTNIK AND VANGUARD
In early October 1957, the Soviet Union surprised the world by successfully
putting into low earth orbit Sputnik 1, a grapefruit-sized, 184 lb. artifıcial
satellite. A second, larger Sputnik followed just weeks later. The Sputniks
stunned theWest, shaking the American public’s confıdence in its scientifıc
and educational establishments.3 Both privately and in public, President
Eisenhower was unimpressed by the Sputniks. He regarded the Soviet
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launches as mere theatrics and remained confıdent that an American space
mission, scheduled for sometime late in 1958, would yieldmore substantive
scientifıc information. But Eisenhower seriously underestimated the extent
to which the Soviet space missions had frightened the public. The days that
followed witnessed a wave of public angst that reverberated through the
American political, military, scientifıc, and educational establishments. The
NewYork Timesworried that themissile technology that lifted Sputnik into
orbit heralded an advance in the throw weight of Soviet IRBMs (intermediate-
range ballistic missiles). Time breathlessly reported “Soviet scientists were
freely predicting successful space flights to the moon by the early 1960’s.”
While admitting that such schemesmight have been discounted in the past,
Time allowed that suchwas no longer the case “since Sputnik.” Dr. Franklin
Murphy, president of the American Council on Education, asserted that
“[n]othing less than a major breakthrough in higher educational efforts”
would restore the nation’s leadership in science and technology. Indeed, as
Kenneth Osgood notes, “to many Americans, the challenge posed by Sput-
nik and other Soviet outer space successes extended beyond the narrow
fıelds of science and technology. The Sputnik challenge was also a cultural
and ideological challenge.”4
Scarcely a week after the Sputnik launch a secret U.S. Information
Agency (USIA) report warned the president that “Soviet claims of scientifıc
and technological superiority over the West and especially the U.S. have
won greatly widened acceptance” and that “[p]ublic opinion in friendly
countries shows decided concern over the possibility that the balance of
military power has shifted or may soon shift in favor of the USSR.”5
Eisenhower was besieged by pleas to do something dramatic to reestablish
confıdence in the West’s scientifıc and technological preeminence. Arthur
Larson, Director of the USIA and former White House speechwriter,
pressed Eisenhower to approve projects that would have a profound effect
on world opinion: “The reason for this . . . is not the value of scientifıc
preeminence for its own sake, but the disproportionate impact that real or
apparent scientifıc preeminence now seems to have on ourmilitary position
and diplomatic bargaining power.”6
At length, Eisenhower succumbed to pleas for a tangible American
answer to the Sputniks. While continuing to insist publicly that America
was not engaged in a “race” with the Russians, Eisenhower announced that
the United States would put a satellite in orbit in December 1957, months
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ahead of its previously scheduled launch date. The ensuing debacle (Van-
guard 1 exploded on the launch pad before a national television audience)
has been well documented elsewhere.7 Months would pass before the
United States could orbit successfully even a small satellite. Even then,
Soviet Premier Khrushchev derided the U.S. Army’s Explorer 1 launch as
that of little more than an “orange.”8 Following yet another Vanguard
failure, Eisenhower and his advisors searched for a way to rehabilitate the
tarnished prestige of American science and technology.
NAUTILUS AS TECHNOLOGY AND SYMBOL
One arena in which the United States held a decisive edge over the Soviet
Unionwas that of nuclear submarine technology. The dream of underwater
atomic supremacy dated from the earliest days of the ColdWar. The world
had only lately witnessed the atom’s destructive power in the bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Now, engaged in an all-out propaganda war with
the Soviet Union, both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations real-
ized that while America’s ability to annihilate a potential enemy must
remain beyond doubt, it was equally (perhaps, especially) important for the
United States to be seen as leading the way in the search for peaceful,
constructive uses of the atom. Indeed, this strategic ambiguity was the
animating idea behind Eisenhower’s ongoing “Atoms for Peace” cam-
paign.9 The concept of employing atomic energy to propel a vessel of some
kind held obvious attractions. A ship thus equipped might become a float-
ing ambassador of American ingenuity, might, and peaceful intentions, as
well as a platform for testing technologies that could one day feed and bring
electric power to millions.
Although the project faced enormous scientifıc, logistical, and political
hurdles, none was a match for the determination of Admiral Hyman Rick-
over, who held the complementary directorships of the Bureau of Naval
Reactors and the Atomic Energy Commission’s Division of Reactor Devel-
opment. Rickover was convinced that the nature of undersea warfare and
the extreme conditions under which submarines operatedmade them ideal
platforms for nuclear propulsion, if a suitable power plant could be devel-
oped. Unlike previous submarines, whichwere essentially surface ships that
could operate under water for relatively brief periods of time, an atomic
submarine would be a true submersible, designed to operate at maximum
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effıciency underwater. Rickover and his engineers set about the task of
designing and building a nuclear-powered submarine and training the crew
needed to operate it.10 Construction proceeded swiftly, thanks to Rickover’s
personal oversight and ability to expedite the normally sluggish navy supply
chain. A functioning prototype of the reactor plant was readied in the Idaho
desert, while back in Groton, Connecticut, a novel teardrop-shaped hull
took shape in the Electric Boat Company’s Thames River shipyard. Crew-
men trained in both locations, rotating as Rickover’s meticulous schedule
dictated. It was he, for instance, who personally selected Captain Eugene
Wilkinson, a decorated World War II submariner as the vessel’s fırst com-
manding offıcer. After completing a successful tour of duty, Wilkinson was
succeeded in 1956 by Commander William Anderson, another Rickover
choice.11
The material characteristics of the new submarine, USS Nautilus, af-
fected its role as a symbol in signifıcant ways. On the one hand, the physical
attributes of Nautilus made it both a daunting addition to the fleet and, at
least potentially, to the “Atoms for Peace” arsenal. At little more than 320
feet in length, Nautilus displaced roughly 3000 tons, larger than most of its
World War II counterparts and certainly more expensive at $55,000,000.
Nautilus was also faster, quieter, and able to stay submerged for far longer,
at greater depths than conventional submarines.12 That Nautilus could be
operated safely was itself a testament to America’s ability to harness the
atom. Equally importantwas that although itwas nuclear powered,Nautilus
was not armedwithmissiles of any kind. Although the implicationwas clear
that future atomic submarines could and very likely would be so equipped,
thatNautilus was notmissile-equipped underscored its value as a symbol of
America’s quest for the peaceful use of atomic energy.
On the other hand, the physical limitations of Nautilus also constrained
her value as a symbol. For instance, Nautilus’s nuclear propulsion system
was admittedly experimental. Despite the navy’s assurances that the subma-
rine’s reactor was entirely safe, no one knew what to expect under the
stresses of operation. Even some allies flinched at the possibilities. For
example, a scheduled visit to Copenhagen by Nautilus’s sister ship, USS
Skate, had to be called off when Danish Premier H. C. Hansen, citing fears
about its safety, refused to grant it docking privileges.13 Another problem
was that while Nautilus enjoyed the advantage of mobility, it could not go
just anywhere. Coastal cities (those that would accept a port call from a
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nuclear-powered vessel) defıned the extent of Nautilus’s effective range as
an “ambassador” of U.S. atomic technology. Moreover, that Nautilus
mounted only six torpedo tubes, fewer even thanmany of its conventionally
powered counterparts, proved a mixed blessing. While enhancing Nauti-
lus’s value as a symbol of peaceful intentions, the submarine’s lack of
fırepower, which was a result of Rickover’s insistence that nothing be
allowed to distract attention from its revolutionary power plant, detracted
from the submarine’s value as a symbol of American might.14 Compound-
ing the problem, Nautilus was crammed with an array of esoteric scientifıc
equipment, much of it cloaked in secrecy, which compromised its value as a
display of the nation’s transparency and good faith.15
Nautilus was more than a submarine; it was a trope for American might
and purpose. And much as the submarine’s anomalous physical character-
istics affected its symbolic value, the symbolic context in which Nautilus
operated limited the material uses to which its technology could be put.
Both forces must be appreciated to understand fully the genesis of Opera-
tion Sunshine. As early as June 1952, President Truman had attempted to
reconcile these dual realities: “This ship will be something new in the
world,” he speculated. “The military signifıcance of this vessel is tremen-
dous, the peaceful signifıcance of the Nautilus is even more breathtaking.
When this ship has been built and operated, controlled atomic power will
have been demonstrated on a substantial scale. . . . Wemay have to live in a
half-peace, half-war condition for a long time to come. . . . [W]e are, at one
and the same time, fortifying the cause of free men everywhere against
aggression and taking a long stride toward the day when man can reap the
material benefıts of the atom.”16 At its launching just 18months later, Chief
of Naval Operations Robert Carney pointed to Nautilus as a “symbol of
man’s dreaming . . . his bright dreams certainly, and if man is not wise, his
nightmares too.”17
The submarine’s very name was charged with symbolic associations. In
calling the new vessel “Nautilus,” the navy had chosen one of the most
illustrious names in undersea exploration and combat, heir to a series of
real-world predecessors, including Robert Fulton’s experimental underwa-
ter craft (1804) and a 3,000 ton behemoth which earned numerous battle
stars in the Pacifıc War.18 Signifıcantly, in 1931, Australian adventurer Sir
Hubert Wilkins had even attempted to reach the North Pole in a converted
World War I submarine he rechristened Nautilus. Wilkins ingeniously
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fıtted his craft with a set of upside down runners that, in theory, would
enable the craft to skate along the underside of the ice cap all the way to the
Pole. Unfortunately, the submarine’s aging diesel engines and then its
batteries failed.Wilkins’s grand adventure culminated ignominiously at the
end of a towline.19
But it is unlikely that any of these earlier craft loomed larger in the public
imagination in the mid-1950s than the fıctional vessel in Jules Verne’s
Twenty-Thousand Leagues Under The Sea. Generations of schoolchildren
had read Verne’s fın de siècle classic. A younger generation had been reared
on the 1954 Disney feature fılm, which updated Verne’s story for ColdWar
audiences. J. P. Telotte notes that the relationship between the realNautilus
and its cinematic counterpart was mutually benefıcial. Stories about the
actual submarine gave a boost to the Disney movie just as the fılm height-
ened the allure of the navy’s remarkable vessel in the publicmind. Although
the 1954 fılm took considerable liberties with Verne’s tale, the technology
that powered the new vessel promised to realize its fıctional counterpart’s
potential to “lift mankind from the depths of hell into heaven . . . or destroy
him.”20
Thus, themeaning ofNautilus resulted from an interplay ofmaterial and
symbolic forces. Nautilus awaited only its moment and a mission to fully
realize its full potential as an instrument of the Cold War. The Sputnik/
Vanguard drama set the stage for just such an opportunity in the formof the
navy’s Operation Sunshine.
“OPERATION SUNSHINE”
Under Wilkinson and his successor, Captain William Anderson, Nautilus
racked up a number of speed and endurance records in its fırst two years of
operation. But though it proved a public relations success for the infant nuclear
navy, the submarine lacked a signature accomplishment, one that brought
together its material and symbolic potential. Then, in late 1957, just two weeks
after the failureofVanguard,CommanderAndersonarrivedat thePentagon to
brief his superiors on the submarine’s participation in “Strikeback, a series of
joint NATO maneuvers in the north Atlantic,” and to report on Nautilus’s
efforts to probe approaches to the Arctic icepack.21
As he was leaving the briefıng, Anderson was approached by the presi-
dent’s naval aide, Pete Aurand, who asked him to drop by his offıce for a
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private chat the next day. According to Anderson’s later account, Aurand
inquired whether a continuously submerged cruise around the world by
Nautilus and its sister ship,USS Skate, might be possible. Anderson thought
it technically feasible, though not exactly awe-inspiring and pitched an
alternative mission: a solo submerged transit across the top of the world.
Fortunately, Aurand “grasped at once the tremendous potential of nuclear
submarine operations in the Arctic” and the two men enthusiastically
discussed Anderson’s idea.22 It was within the submarine’s physical capa-
bilities andwith the propermanagement, the spectacle could help to restore
the shaken confıdence of the American public.
President Eisenhower was quick to embrace the concept. Indeed, when
the Nautilus later returned from Operation Sunshine White House Press
Secretary James Hagerty went so far as to claim that his boss had come up
with the idea in the fırst place.23 Whatever the case, planning for the polar
mission began in earnest early in the new year. Themissionwas code named
“Operation Sunshine,” a nod to an auspicious moment when the sun broke
through gray skies at the submarine’s commissioning ceremony nearly four
years earlier. If successful, the mission indeed would cast a ray of sunshine
onto the bleak post-Sputnik landscape. A submerged transpolar crossing
would be the sort of dramatic spectacle the West needed, provide valuable
scientifıc information, and send an unmistakable message to domestic and
foreign audiences that the navy was capable of operating within striking
distance of the Soviet heartland. In brief, Operation Sunshine was amission
that fully exploited Nautilus’s material capabilities and her potential as a
strategically ambiguous symbol. “But if the transpolar trip was to be a
propaganda success,” Anderson noted, “it had to be done neatly, safely,
quickly” And, until it was a demonstrable success, secretly as well.
24
Eisenhower wanted no more public humiliations like “Vanguard.”
Moreover, the president was still unhappy over leaks concerningNautilus’s
prior operations under the arctic icecap, which he felt had squandered a
promising propaganda opportunity. Consequently, knowledge of Opera-
tion Sunshine was restricted to a tight circle of individuals on a “need to
know” basis. Elaborate subterfuges and cover stories cloaked the operation
in near total secrecy. Eisenhower “realized that by controlling the revelation
of a successful mission of this magnitude, he could ensure worldwide
attention. On the other hand, if there should be a failure, he alone could
minimize the damage and take the responsibility.”25
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After months of planning, reconnoitering, and one false start, Nautilus
crossed the North Pole 400 feet below the ice, making 20 knots, at 11:15 PM
EDTonAugust 3, 1958. On board,Nautilus carriedAnderson and a crew of
116, including civilian ice scientist Dr. Waldo Lyon and a revolutionary
inertial guidance system designed specifıcally for the demands of polar
navigation. Captain Anderson counted the moment down for his crew. He
then offered a brief tribute to the polar explorers who had come before,
braving hardship and death, endeavoring to achieve what they had accom-
plished with such apparent ease. Then, its jukebox switched back on, Nau-
tilus pointed its bow south and resumed its normal shipboard routine.26
Two days later, the submarine surfaced in theAtlantic Ocean off Iceland.
Only then did it send to Washington its top secret, but soon-to-be famous
signal “Nautilus 90 North” acknowledging the successful completion of the
polar transit. In Washington, Admiral Burke informed the president. At
dawn two days later, a navy helicopter plucked Anderson from the deck of
the Nautilus in the Greenland Sea. On board to escort Anderson in secrecy
to Washington, D.C. was Aurand, traveling as “Captain E. P. Adams.” The
public phase of Operation Sunshine was about to get underway.
On Friday afternoon, August 8, more than 100 reporters and photogra-
phers crammed into the White House briefıng room, enticed by Press
Secretary Hagerty’s promise of a “showcase presentation” which just might
include an appearance by the president. The press set up its cameras and
waited amid speculation as to what the announcement might be. Then, at
1:30 PM precisely, a small group of dignitaries, including Naval Aide
Aurand, Press Secretary Hagerty, Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke,
and Commander and Mrs. Anderson (who had been flown in from the
couple’s Connecticut home for the occasion)—followed by the president
himself, entered the packed briefıng room through a side door. Inexplicably,
Admiral Rickover, “father of the nuclear submarine,” was not invited, an
oversight that both the navy and the White House would have cause to
regret, as it set off a small fırestorm that threatened to overshadow the
administration’s carefully constructed narrative.27
But for the moment, Eisenhower was buoyant. He announced to the
world that an American atomic submarine, the USS Nautilus, had success-
fully transited under the polar icecap from the Pacifıc to the Atlantic,
breaching the North Pole in the process. In his remarks, Eisenhower spoke
briefly of Nautilus’s achievement. The president awarded Anderson the
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Legion of Merit and presented a special Unit Citation to the offıcers and
crew of Nautilus. He then left the room. The press secretary took a few
questions from the press while copies of a “fact sheet” on the mission,
prepared earlier by Anderson, circulated around the room.28 ThenHagerty
turned the conference over to Anderson, who patiently answered reporters’
questions about the particulars of the voyage. After the news conference,
Anderson was flown back to the Nautilus, still in mid-ocean. The now-
famous submarine proceeded to Portsmouth, England, where the crew
enjoyed a celebratory port call.29 After that, it was home to a heroes’
welcome for Nautilus and its crew, including a ticker-tape parade in
New York City. Admiral Rickover, whose “snubbing” at the postmission
news briefıng had set off a fırestorm of criticism in the press, was on hand
to welcome the Nautilus to New York as the president’s personal
representative.30
Operation Sunshine thus consisted of three interrelated phases: the
planning phase, the polar transection itself, and the rhetorical exploitation
of the voyage, whichmay be said to have begunwith the press conference on
August 8. In addition to the formidable technical challenges involved in
mounting the expedition itself, the domestic propaganda value of Opera-
tion Sunshine necessitated that the White House accounts of the mission
reconcile itsmaterial and symbolic aspects so that theAmerican public (and
close allies) drew the desired lessons from the event. To ensure that it did so,
it was necessary that the architects of Operation Sunshine surmount at least
three rhetorical obstacles.
PROMISE AND THREAT
At his press conference on August 8, Eisenhower elected to portray Opera-
tion Sunshine entirely in benefıcent terms. Citations for Anderson and the
crew of Nautilus avoided mention of the military ramifıcations of the
voyage and praised them only for opening “the possibility of a new com-
mercial seaway, a Northwest Passage, between the major oceans of the
world,” while noting that “nuclear powered cargo submarines may, in the
future, use this route to the advantage of world trade.” Hagerty, in his
remarks, claimed merely that Nautilus had returned from the Pole with “a
raft of scientifıc information,” which would benefıt commercial mariners
everywhere.31
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This portrayal ofOperation Sunshine cast the polarmission as the herald
of a better life for millions in the developing world. Echoing the theme,
Captain Anderson told a reporter within the week that “[t]here appears to
be no upper limit to the size you can build submarines and I think cargo
submarines carrying a priority cargo such as oil are defınitely coming along
in the future. The possibility of carrying oil from Alaska to Europe by this
short route is very promising.”32 Anderson continued to champion the idea
in the months that followed, predicting that “large submarines would carry
cargo from Asia to Europe on the route the Nautilus had pioneered under
the North Pole.”33 Yet, if such a venture ever was contemplated, it was
quietly dismissed. There is no evidence that the development of nuclear-
powered cargo submarines or underwater “tug trains” ever received serious
consideration from the Eisenhower administration.
Visions of “tug trains” and “cargo submarines” were all to the good, but
unspoken behind them was the confıdence-building image of American
submarines prowling in the Soviet Union’s back yard. The lightly armed
Nautilus posed no immediate threat, but who was to say what the future
held now that the arctic ice had been broken, so to speak? Thus, the decision
to frame Operation Sunshine as an illustration of American magnanimity
while leaving open the possibility that it might have more sinister implica-
tions reconciled the material fact of the transpolar crossing itself with the
symbolic aims of the White House.
THE REMARKABLE AS ROUTINE
Given the soul-searching occasioned by Sputnik/Vanguard, it was impor-
tant to convince the American public that its educational and scientifıc
establishments were still capable of accomplishing extraordinary feats on a
routine basis. The application of the remarkable technology of theNautilus
to such a venture so ripe with signifıcance was ideal. Operation Sunshine
could deflect attention away from the space race and promote the compe-
tence and ingenuity of the American scientifıc establishment. At the same
time, it presented an opportunity to contrast the quiet competence of the
West with Soviet blustering over the Sputniks. Hence, the effort to simulta-
neously trumpet and downplay Nautilus’s polar cruise.
By emphasizing Nautilus’s mastery over one of nature’s most extreme
climates, the polar mission proclaimed that American science and technol-
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ogy, if temporarily eclipsed by the Sputniks, was still preeminent in the
world. The myriad technical challenges posed by the mission, not to men-
tion its very audacity, bespoke national greatness. No other nation, includ-
ing the Soviet Union, could have achieved such a daring and complex feat.
At the same time, efforts were made by theWhite House to treat Operation
Sunshine as if it were a fairly routine product of American science and
technology. Indeed, theWhite House seemed to put out both messages. An
example of this studied ambiguity was Eisenhower’s own behavior at the
press conference on August 8. By relaying, through his press secretary, that
he would personally attend an event, Eisenhower dangled an almost irre-
sistible mystery before the press. But by leaving the briefıng room and
allowinghispress secretaryandthemissioncommander toconduct thebulkof the
event, he treated the event in an almost casual manner. In the same way,
Anderson’s “Fact Sheet” offered a curious mixture of the arcane and the
prosaic. It featured, for instance, details about the total length of the cruise
and the depth of the ocean at the pole, alongside the number of movies—
38—watched by the crew during the voyage. Echoing both of these themes,
Lifemagazine asserted “the great subsurface polar crossing was essentially a
triumph ofmachinery and of diverse intellects of themenwho had invented
it. Nautilus herself was the star of the show.”34
SUBMARINE AND CREW
But an assertion such as the onemade by Life, though in itself flattering, was
problematic in another way. Indeed, a third area where the symbolic and
material capabilities of Nautilus necessitated careful rhetorical manage-
ment during the course of Operation Sunshine was that of the submarine’s
relationship to its human crew. Clarifying that relationship in the press
accounts of the mission could be important because it would presumably
influence popular views about the sort of warriors America needed to pilot
her through the atomic age, as well as their relationship to the technologies
of Cold War. While the rhetorical objectives of the White House dictated
the foregrounding of the submarine’s performance, doing so ran the risk of
reducing her crew to mere cogs-in-the machine, thus undermining Amer-
ica’s standing as “the land of the free and the home of the brave.” The
problem was how to present Operation Sunshine so as to promote the one
without denigrating the other.
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There is no doubt that conditions aboard the Nautilus were relatively
comfortable in comparison to those of its predecessors. Even before Oper-
ation Sunshine, for instance, the navy had retained a well-known interior
decorator to create a color scheme that would be cheery and relaxing for the
crew during their prolonged cruises. BecauseNautilus did not need to carry
large amounts of diesel fuel, the navy boasted that it had considerably more
room for living and working. In contrast to their counterparts aboard
conventional boats, the crew of the Nautilus enjoyed private bunks, each
with its own air conditioning vent, plenty of hot water for showers, abun-
dant fresh air (continuously “scrubbed” by an innovative fıltering process)
and greatly expanded mess and recreation spaces. The submarine’s ward-
room, for example, was four times larger than that of conventional subma-
rines.Moreover, nomatter how cold it was outside, the submarine’s interior
temperature remained at a constant 72 degrees. And Nautilus, it was said,
was so stable at operating depth that seasickness or even the sensation of
motion itself was nonexistent.35
Generations of arctic explorers had endured exposure, isolation, and
deprivation as the price of polar conquest. But at Hagerty’s post-Sunshine
briefıng on August 8, 1958, reporters learned that as Nautilus glided across
the top of the world its crew feasted on ameal of steak, french fries, creamed
carrots and peas, fruit salad, and “North Pole Cake.”Where their predeces-
sors had seen only the next pressure ridge in an interminable wasteland of
ice, the men of Nautilus enjoyed closed circuit TV and watched movies
during the four-day transit. While icy darkness reigned outside, life within
Nautilus was governed by warmth, light, comfort and the usual routines of
life at sea. Lifemagazine commented on the contrasts, remarking that “[b]y
cruising under the Pole with a jukebox and a coke machine, they doubtless
caused the shades of Frobisher, Peary andAmundsen to flap like nightshirts
in a gale, but they also altered concepts of the arctic which had been building
up in the minds of men for centuries. One touch of hardship would have
ruined the whole effect” and averred that “[i]t seemed like the ship herself
wanted to make the trip” one crew member told a reporter.36
After enduring months of embarrassment over Sputniks, it was diffıcult
for theWhite House not to boast about the capabilities of such amachine as
Nautilus. Yet doing so carried its own risks. To highlight these it might be
useful to recall Kenneth Burke’s observations on the relationship between
agencies and agents. Emphasizing the submarine’s provision of safety,
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effıciency, and even comfort during Operation Sunshine risked reducing
the crew of Nautilus to mere extensions of their amazing machine. Such a
conclusion could undermine the traditional American virtues of freedom,
self-reliance, and heroism and, besides, was hardly the stuff of recruiting
posters.37
The possibility that the American public might conclude that they were
automatons, and coddled ones at that, may explain why efforts were made
to humanize and stress the expertise of the submarine’s offıcers and crew.
For example, a brief biographical sketch released by the White House
portrayed Anderson as a battle-tested World War II veteran, a warrior of
raw courage who had, even so, mastered the extremely challenging physics
of nuclear propulsion. An article entitled “Modern Captain Nemo” in the
NewYorkTimes quoted a fellow offıcer’s assessment ofAnderson as “always
cool. They picked the right man for this assignment.” The writer went on to
characterize Anderson as quiet and resourceful, the kind of man who could
regard the terrors of the unknown as merely a series of problems to be
solved.38 Yet Anderson was not just brave and intelligent. He was also the
epitome of the all-American male: a modest lad from rural Tennessee who
grew up with a dream of going to sea. He enjoyed woodworking and
building model ships. He and his wife Bonnie had two boys, a dog, and a
mortgage. To burnish his credentials as a familyman, theWhiteHouse even
had Mrs. Anderson flown down from Connecticut to appear at his side for
Hagerty’s “showcase presentation.”39
In similar fashion, the risk that the crew of Nautilus might be seen as
mere extensions of the submarine’s technology was mitigated by highlight-
ing the crew’s technical prowess and basic humanity. Thus, crewmen of the
Nautilus were depicted as prototypes for a new kind of sailor: cool, highly
trained professionals on the job, yet easygoing, “regular guys” when off
duty. Volunteers all, the crew were handpicked for their “high ability,
emotional stability, and discretion” and being conversant with “themyster-
ies of atomic propulsion . . . once under the ice cap the men of theNautilus
were simply servants of their wonderful machine.” While Nautilus cruised
at 20 knots under the ice, they calmlywent about their assigned duties. “One
would think Washington had built them to specifıcation,” Life wrote. And
yet, “there does not seem to be one who cannot be identifıed as an honest,
open, clean-cut all-American, small town boy that could be found in a
Norman Rockwell painting.” In the devil-may-care tradition of sailors
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everywhere, they could even share a laugh in the face of danger, as when
some enterprising crewmen staged a visit from “Santa,” who questioned the
submarine’s intrusion into his frozen domains. In a gesture somehow
emblematic of the mission’s theme, Electrician’s Mate First Class James
Sordelet even reenlisted mid-voyage because he wanted to be the fırst sailor
ever to do so at the North Pole.40
CONCLUSION
Technological spectacles such as Operation Sunshine represented an im-
portant rhetorical weapon throughout the Cold War era. They were inher-
ently risky gambles, but when they succeeded they could generate rich
benefıts on both the domestic and international propaganda fronts. The
foregoing analysis of the dynamics of Operation Sunshine illustrates the
mission’s genesis and development while raising some broader questions
for students of rhetoric as well.
In the short term, Operation Sunshine provided a much-needed boost
for the West at a critical moment in the Cold War. At home, the New York
Times devoted extensive frontpage coverage to the polar crossing onAugust
9, 1958. A lengthy story quoted California SenatorWilliam F. Knowland as
stating that themission “should give us courage and remind us to have faith.
It shows that this is no time to sell America short.”41 The following week,
Time crowed: “In the high stakes power and propaganda contest called the
cold war, the U.S. piled up one of its biggest weekly scores so far. Capturing
men’s imaginations around the world, and replying persuasively to Russia’s
Sputniks, the U.S. Navy’s atomic submarine Nautilus completed a historic
transpolar voyage under the vast arctic ice pack, fulfılling in a 20th century
way the centuries old dream of a northern passage from ocean to ocean.”42
Overseas, America’s allies were both impressed and relieved. Congratula-
tory telegrams flowed into the White House from world fıgures such as
German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Italian Prime Minister Amint-
ore Fanfani. French Premier Charles DeGaulle, ever jealous of Gallic pride,
invoked the ghost of Jules Verne: “Thanks to the United States Navy, the
NAUTILUS, whose expected exploits generations of Frenchmen have
learned about in advance, has accomplished its destiny.”43 In a somewhat
more generous vein, the London Daily Telegraph wrote: “The voyage of the
atom-driven submarine Nautilus under the North Pole is a victory for
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Western diplomacy. For the fırst time since Russia exploded herH-bomb in
1953, the United States appears to have recovered the military initiative.” It
was, the Telegraph added, “America’s answer to the Soviet sputnik.”44
Thus, the foregoing analysis underscores one way in which rhetorical
studies can enliven our understanding of Cold War events by disclosing
how they wove symbolic and material considerations together to form a
persuasive tapestry. Operation Sunshine could not have succeeded absent
either of these elements, nor can a full accounting of the vessel and its polar
mission afford to ignore their close interrelationship. This study thus illus-
trates how an understanding of the rhetorical constraints involved can
enrich our understanding and appreciation of historical events.45
This study of Operation Sunshine also reveals some of the complications
that may arise when technologies are rhetoricized for propagandistic pur-
poses. On one hand, technological achievements can act as a type of atech-
nic proof, tangibly dramatizing the capacity and commitment of a
government to produce breakthroughs that benefıt domestic and allied
audiences. As noted earlier, an impressive body of research on the Eisen-
hower administration’s “Atoms for Peace” campaign has elaborated on the
government’s efforts to “domesticate” the atom in just this fashion. This
study, it is hoped, contributes to that body of work by examining how the
physical limitations of a given technology both empower and limit efforts to
exploit it for propagandistic ends. Inmanyways, the physical characteristics
of Nautilus enhanced its value as a symbol that could be adapted simulta-
neously to different audiences. BecauseNautiluswas nomere symbol, but a
material reality as well, her propagandistic value was arguably magnifıed.
On the other hand, Nautilus’s very materiality constrained its value as a
symbol. The novel and possibly dangerous technology concealed within its
opaque shell effectively reduced the submarine’s range of operations by
making some ports “off limits.” The submarine’s relatively light armament,
a concession to the size and weight of its power plant and to Rickover’s
desire to promote nuclear propulsion, limited its value as a symbol of
Americanmilitarymight. The rigorous training and technological expertise
of its elite crew could also make the nuclear navy seem an arcane and
inaccessible branch of the service to recruits. And fınally, the expense
involved in buildingNautilus and training its crewmade its use on ordinary
missions where standard diesel technology would serve as well seem a
luxury. Such a marvel begged for a marvelous mission. In sum, the materi-
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ality ofNautiluswas not an unalloyed advantage; it constrained her rhetor-
ical value in important ways, necessitating that she be “managed” so as to
maximize her potential and minimize her liabilities.
Finally, this case study illuminates some rhetorical dilemmas in Opera-
tion Sunshine that may apply to technological spectacles in general. Half a
century ago, the American public arguably viewed every scientifıc achieve-
ment through the lens of the ColdWar. Throughwhat lens(es) do they view
comparable achievements today? Do any rhetorical dilemmas comparable
to those present in Operation Sunshine influence twenty-fırst century tech-
nological spectaculars, or were they artifacts of a particular time and place?
For in an age of cyber warfare, “smart” battlefıelds, and remotely operated
Mars Rovers, the spectacles of technology are no less common today than
they were 60 years ago.
The greatest technological spectacular of all, America’s decade-long pro-
gram toput amanon themoon,was only a couple of years away in the summer
of 1958. It is tempting to speculate that as prelude to that undertaking, Opera-
tion Sunshine anticipated some of the rhetorical dilemmas ahead. This is
especially truewith regard to the somewhat tricky relationship betweenhuman
beings and the astonishing machinery of space flight. ForNautilus itself, how-
ever, fameproved fleeting.Withindays, its polar transit hadbeenduplicated by
its newer counterpart, USS Skate. Although Nautilus remained on active duty
until 1981, it had enjoyed its brief moment in the sun. It may be that a similar
fate awaits all such fırsts, spectacular as they may appear to us at the moment
when rhetoric aligns thematerial and the symbolic.
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